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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Adiyan Haran ("Haran") established in his opening brief that the 
City of Escalante ("City") Board of Adjustment improperly allowed, contrary to 
the City Zoning Ordinance, the expansion of a nonconforming livestock operation 
on the residential lot next to his residence. The substantial evidence before the 
Board of Adjustment was that, in the April 1996 timeframe, the lot at issue was 
used to store at most six animals. Sometime after year 2000, when the fences were 
repaired and upgraded, the livestock operation expanded significantly, to the point 
of creating odor, noise, dust and runoff issues for the neighboring property owners. 
The Board's ruling allowing eighteen animals plus their offspring to be stored on 
this residential lot was contrary to the substantial evidence and must be reserved. 
The City's brief attempts to justify the Board's decision by trying to find 
ways to argue around the substantial evidence and, in the alternative, to read the 
restriction against commercial cattle operations out of the Zoning Ordinance. Mr. 
Haran seeks this Court's assistance in overturning the Board's decision and 
limiting the use of the adjoining residential lot to no more than six animals. The 
key evidence came directly from the owner of the animals at issue who claimed to 
have kept a few animals, up to six or half a dozen, up to the April 1996 timeframe. 
The Board arbitrarily ignored this evidence, which evidence was supported by the 
other relevant record testimony. The limitation of the use to no more than six 
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animals is required under the nonconforming use provision of the Zoning 
Ordinance, which strictly prohibits expansion of nonconforming uses. 
REPLV ARGUMENT 
L REPLY TO CITY'S FACTUAL STATEMENT 
Haran makes the following points in reply to certain factual statements in the 
City's brief. 
Reply to Fact Paragraphs 9-10. Mr. Alvey's testimony covered historical 
use of the property up to the year 1990, and thus lacked specific relevance to the 
use of the property in April of 1996, the key timeframe for grandfathering 
nonconforming uses under the City of Escalante Zoning Ordinance. The Board of 
Adjustment noted this point. (R. 72-73). 
Reply to Fact Paragraphs 16-19. Counsel's question to Mr. Lyman asked 
whether "before the fence was upgraded [year 2000], at the most you had a few 
animals, maybe six at most on that property?" Mr. Lyman answered, "Possibly." 
(R. 85-86; emphasis added). Mr. Lyman was not confused by this question, which 
made no distinction between cows or calves or horses or llamas. It was a question 
about animals, period. When pressed by the City's attorney as to uhow many did 
you have on there" up to April 1996, Mr. Lyman placed his best estimate at "half a 
dozen, possibly." (R. 84; emphasis added). Mr. Lyman did not provide any other 
estimate of the number of animals he had on the property up until April of 1996. 
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His testimony cited by the City in paragraph 18 referred to "last winter" which 
would have been the winter of 2007-2008, over ten years after the Zoning 
Ordinance was enacted. (R. 84). 
Reply to Fact Paragraphs 13, 20. Lyman testified that in 1997, very close to 
the timeframe the Zoning Ordinance was passed, he had "taken his animals off 
the property. (R. 79-80; emphasis added). During this time a Mr. Nelson used the 
property to store some horses, and then for a year or a year and a half after Mr. 
Nelson used the property the lot was vacant, with no animals. (R. 79-80). This is 
consistent with the evidence in the letter submitted by the owner of the property, 
Mr. Coombs. He stated that he allowed a Mr. Nelson to use the property "for a 
place to keep his horses and as a camp spot, for a few years . . . ." (R. 60). Mr. 
Haran and Mr. Lyman testified that a few cows were then placed on the property 
around 1999 or 2000 in order to eat down the weeds. (R. 79-80, 101). Mr. 
Coombs also stated: "After complaints from Mr. Haran [in 1999 or 2000], cattle 
were placed in the lot to keep the weeds down, and alleviate the fire hazard." (R. 
60; emphasis added). Overall, the City's recitation of facts does not support the 
Board's finding that up to 18 animals plus their offspring were on the property in 
the April 1996 timeframe. Rather, the record testimony shows that from 1990 
through 1999 or 2000 the property was sporadically used for a few animals, the 
most being six or half a dozen, until after the fences were repaired in 
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approximately 2000, when Mr. Haran, Mr. Mosier and Mr. Sorenson all testified to 
a significant increase in the numbers of animals on the property, which is 
supported by the photographic evidence. (City's Fact Paragraphs 21-25; 
photographs at R. 43-55). The fact that Mr. Haran did not recall seeing any 
animals on the property in the mid to late 1990's is not inconsistent with the 
overall testimony, given the limited and sporadic nature of the use of the property 
during those years. 
Reply to Fact Paragraph 23. Mr. Sorenson's testimony did not differ with 
Mr. Haran's. He recalled at most half a dozen animals (horses and llamas 
combined) on the property in 1993 (R. 95), which was before Mr. Haran purchased 
the property in 1994 and relocated to it in 1995 (R. 102-103). Mr. Sorenson's 
testimony at record pages 94-95 was that he did not recall seeing Mr. Lyman's 
cows on the property until after April 1996. Mr. Sorenson did not provide any 
numbers of animals on the property during 1996 and testified that the numbers of 
animals on the property increased and became a problem (noise, odor, dust, runoff) 
after Faye Alvey died in 2000. (R. 93-94). 
Reply to Fact Paragraph 28. The City admits that the Board of Adjustment 
based its decision upon a finding that Mr. Lyman claimed he had twelve cows on 
the property in the three years prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance. 
(City's Brief at 11.) Mr. Lyman's testimony was that from the mid to late 1980's 
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he had 4[a]nywhere from one to a dozen" cows on the property. (R. 84). This 
testimony was not specific to the timeframe leading up to April of 1996. As noted 
above, when asked about the specific timeframe leading up to and including April 
1996, Mr. Lyman testified twice that the most animals he could recall having on 
the property back then was half a dozen. The fundamental error by the Board of 
Adjustment was failing to focus on Mr. Lyman's testimony of the extent of use up 
to April 1996, as opposed to Mr. Lyman's more general testimony covering the 
entire time from the mid to late 1980's up to the time of the hearing. 
II. HARAN MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
Haran properly marshaled the evidence focusing on the relevant timeframe 
of April 1996. Contrary to the City's argument (City's Brief at 12-14), Mr. Haran 
did not omit any relevant evidentiary points. First, the City says Haran omitted 
Mr. Lyman's testimony about the one to a dozen cows. Haran in fact cited and 
discussed this evidence at page 10 of his opening brief. Haran correctly pointed 
out the fact that Mr. Lyman, when pressed as to the timeframe leading up to April 
of 1996, set the number at half a dozen. (Haran's Brief at 10-11.) Second, the City 
cites to Mr. Sorenson's testimony about horses and llamas. This testimony was 
discussed at page 5 of Haran's brief. Third, the City points to Sorenson's 
testimony about when he recalled first seeing cows on the property. Haran cited 
to and discussed Sorenson's testimony at pages 5-6 of his brief. Finally, the City 
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points to a supposed admission by Haran that he did not keep count of the numbers 
of animals before September 1996. Haran made no such admission I le stated he 
was not keeping written records over the entire time covered in the log he 
submitted into evidence. (R. 98). However, he testified from his memory (as did 
all the witnesses) about the use of the property, in his case starting when he bought 
the property in 1994. (R. 100-103). Unlike the other witnesses, Mr. Haran started 
keeping a written log, in 2004, to document the problems caused by the increasing 
numbers of cows. (R. 98). 
In short, Haran properly marshaled the evidence. He recited the testimony 
of every witness, focusing on the relevant timeframe of April 1996. He attached 
the entire record, which is relatively short, and cited to the photographic evidence. 
All of this evidence, when examined witness by witness and as a whole, supports 
one finding that could be reached by a reasonable person* limited, periodic use of 
the property at issue for storing up to six animals between 1990 and April 1996. 
111 I HL P I * CANNOT EXPLAIN AWAY THE RECORD EVIDENCE, 
PARTICULARLY MR. LYMAN'S TESTIMONY. 
The City argues why Mr. Lyman's testimony, setting his use of the property 
at six animals up until 1996, should be ignored. The City first argues that for range 
management purposes the government and local ranchers count a cow and calf as 
one animal unit (City's Brief at 9, 15). The assumption applied to counting cows 
for purposes of managing range areas on public lands cannot be used to overcome 
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the testimony of Mr. Lyman, and other witnesses, about the actual use of the 
property at issue. The same is true with respect to the City's argument about cows 
versus heifers. (City's Brief at 16). 
The City then suggests Mr. Lyman was confused about dates. (City's Brief, 
at 16.) Mr. Lyman was asked pointed questions about the use of the property up 
until April of 1996. Mr. Lyman's simple responses to simple questions cannot be 
discounted based upon alleged confusion. Mr. Lyman was given ample 
opportunity to answer the key question and twice reluctantly admitted, consistent 
with the other witnesses, that the use of the property was limited to a few animals, 
half a dozen at most, prior to April 1996. 
The City also relies upon the testimony of Mr. Alvey. (City's Brief, at 15.) 
However, as noted above, the Board correctly found Mr. Alvey's testimony, which 
only covered up to 1990, had no evidentiary value on the issue of the use in April 
1996. 
The City tries to argue Mr. Sorenson's and Mr. Mosier's testimony 
somehow was inconsistent with Mr. Haran's. Even if this were true, which as 
shown above it is not, their overall testimony clearly supports one reasonable 
finding: limited use of the property at issue for storing at most six animals prior to 
April of 1996. The City also makes a confusing point about the animals 
supposedly being able to wander between Mr. Lyman's property and Mr. Coomb's 
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property and then tries to link this to Mr. Mosier's testimony. City's Brief at 17, n. 
5. The relevant fact is thai Mi. Mosier did not recall seeing any cows on the 
property at issue (Mr. Coomb's) until after 2000, when he noticed a herd of cows 
on the property. 
In sum, given the overall evidence, in particular the testimony of Mr. 
Lyman, the only reasonable finding a person could make was of limited, periodic 
use for storing up to six animals between 1990 and April 1996. The Board's 
arbitrary decision to combine horse and cow numbers to allow eighteen aci I 
animals, then throw in their offspring, was contrary to the substantial evidence of 
the actual use and must be overturned on that basis. 
IV. THE CITY SEEKS TO READ THE PROHIBITION IN THE 
RESIDENTIAL ZONE AGAINST COMMERCIAL CATTLE 
OPERATIONS OUT OF THE ORDINANCE. 
As a fallback position, the City advances a tortured reading of the allowed 
uses under the residential zoning ordinance. It argues the allowance of a corral on 
residential properties to store animals, Chapter 18-2(4) of the Zoning Ordinance, 
somehow opens the door to unlimited commercial livestock use on a residential lot. 
The City's argument violates the rule of statutory construction which provides that 
a court must avoid interpretations which render portions of a statute inoperative 
and the rule that the more specific of two provisions governs over the more 
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general. See Hall v. Utah State Department of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 963 (Utah 
2001). 
Chapter 18-2(1), subpart b, of the Zoning Ordinance, which specifically 
applies to the keeping of animals on residential lots, provides that they can be kept 
for "recreation or for family food production for the primary use of persons 
residing on the premises." No one resides on the vacant lot owned by Mr. 
Coombs, so no animals can be kept there. The use of the vacant lot by Mr. Lyman 
to store his animals, especially for his commercial cattle operation, is a 
nonconforming use. Any other reading would eviscerate Chapter 18-2(1), subpart 
b, along with the protections against undue impacts on adjoining property owners 
provided in the RR-1-20 residential zone applicable in this case, the most 
restrictive zone within the Zoning Ordinance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the Board of Adjustment decision as being against 
the substantial evidence. The Court should order that the pre-existing 
nonconforming use was limited to six total animals, be they horses, cows, or 
llamas, adults or offspring. The Zoning Ordinance requires this finding based 
upon the record evidence and based upon its strict limitation on any expansion of 
nonconforming uses. The nonconforming use provisions of the Zoning Ordinance 
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are meant to protect residential property owners, like Mr. Haran, from the 
expansion of use that is interfering with his enjoyment of his property. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 2010. 
MICHAEL A. ZOE>y/ 
PARSONS BEHLESi LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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